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TEPSA POLICY PAPER 
 
‘TIME TO HIT THE RESET BUTTON:  
“THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP AFTER THE VILNIUS SUMMIT 
AND THE ROLE OF RUSSIA“’ 
 
Katrin Böttger1 
Berlin, 19 March 2014 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Despite the fact that Georgia and Moldova initialled their Association Agreements (AA) 
at the Vilnius Eastern Partnership Summit on 28/29 November 2013, the summit and its 
aftermath have to be rated as a low point in the Eastern Partnership. Not only did then 
President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych refuse to sign the Association Agreement for 
Ukraine, favouring instead a loan and a reduction in gas prices from Russia. This refusal 
to sign the Association Agreement initially resulted in frustration and protests at the end 
of 2013. Later on it led to the mobilisation of extreme right wing forces civil unrest and 
in February 2014 to numerous deaths on the streets of Kyiv. 
The final outcome of the open confrontation of the EU and Russia after the Vilnius 
Summit is still unclear, as the events about the future of Crimea are still unfolding. 
Nonetheless some preliminary lessons from the Ukrainian case can be drawn. In order 
to do so, this paper will give a brief account of the events in Ukraine and EU’s role 
therein before giving some ideas of what this means for the role of Russia and the 
Eastern Partnership in the short and medium term and offering policy 
recommendations for the improvement of the Eastern Partnership. Thereby, it will 
argue that the EU overestimated its attractiveness to the Ukrainian leadership due to the 
pressure of short-term decision making in politics and underestimated the reservations 
Russia had regarding the Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Area (DCFTA) and how much it was willing to pay to prevent its signing. The 
events unfolding after the interim government took office on 27 February 2014 
including the secession referendum in Crimea and Russia’s recognition of its 
independence on 17 March 2014 are further indicators for Russia’s opposition to 
Ukrainian western alignment. 
 
2. THE UKRAINE AND THE AA/DCFTA 
 
The negotiations on the Association Agreement, a new and enhanced basis for 
cooperation started in autumn 2008. During the round of negotiations on 11 November 
2011 in Brussels, Kyiv agreed to Brussels’ term-free contract but secured the option to 
revise it after five years with both parties’ consent. Ukraine also agreed to make changes 
in its law, extending the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court to citizens of 
Ukraine. However, the most disputed issue remained unresolved: the inclusion of a 
formal note on the prospect of EU membership, for which Ukraine had been pushing but 
                                                 
1 Dr. Katrin Böttger is Deputy Director of the Institut für Europäische Politik, Berlin and Project leader of 
„The EU’s policy towards Eastern Europe and Central Asia – A key role for Germany“ funded by the Otto 
Wolff Foundation. This paper covers the time frame up to 19 March 2014.  
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which gave various EU member states (especially France and Germany) cause for 
concern. On 20 December 2011, the negotiations were finalized, ultimately not including 
mention of a prospective EU membership for Ukraine. The Association Agreement 
nonetheless constituted a major step for Ukraine towards much closer ties with the EU, 
and signing the Agreement would elicit an unprecedented level of integration between 
the EU and a country without a membership perspective. The level of integration could 
be as high as 80% of the acquis communautaire, since the agreement also includes a 
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement.2 
 
The DCFTA envisages the following trade regime between the EU and Ukraine: Duty free 
exports to the EU for industrial products; loosen quotas on duty-free exports of selected 
agricultural products, including dairy products, grain and cereals, and sugar, to the EU; 
transition periods for tariff liberalization in Ukraine; duty free imports of a majority of 
EU agricultural products into Ukraine; special regimes for imports of motor vehicles and 
for second-hand clothes into Ukraine; abolishment of EU agricultural exports subsidies 
in trade with Ukraine; gradual elimination Ukraine’s export duties, but introduction of 
temporary surcharges on exports of sunflower seeds, nonferrous metal scrap, and cattle 
skins under so-called “bilateral protection measures”; and finally further service trade 
liberalization. The full implementation of this DCFTA is likely to take at least 5–10 years. 
But while the Association Agreement was supposed to be ratified at the end of 2011, it 
was postponed due to the legal situation in Ukraine, most notably relating to the case of 
former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. The EU threatened not to sign the Association 
Agreement if Tymoshenko remained in jail since it considered her conviction a 
renunciation of the rule of law and democracy. Despite condemning the conviction of 
Tymoshenko, the European Parliament continued to fight for the ratification of the 
Association Agreement. In a resolution passed on 27 October 2011, Parliament argued 
that signing the Association Agreement could serve as a lever to bring about the reforms 
in Ukraine favoured by the EU. According to the European Parliament, the agreement 
should have already been initialled by the end of 2011, while MEPs also said it should be 
possible to suspend the agreement temporarily should fundamental principles be 
breached. Tymoshenko and civil society urged the European Union to sign the 
Association Agreement as well, emphasizing that her conviction should not lead the EU 
to question closer integration with Ukraine. The Association Agreement was initialled on 
30 March 2012 as a compromise, but no resolution to the Yulia Tymoshenko case had 
been found. By then, the EU had managed to manoeuvre itself into a corner by insisting 
on unrealistic conditions, namely that Tymoshenko be freed before signing of the 
Association Agreement. Reforms should have been the objectives, not the prerequisites 
for EU cooperation with this transforming state.  
 
The Foreign Affairs Council in December 2012 reaffirmed its commitment to the 
Association Agreement, underlining that Ukraine had control over the pace of the 
                                                 
2 Emerson, Michael, T. Huw Edwards, Ildar Gazizullin, Matthias Lücke, Daniel Müller-Jentsch, Vira 
Nanivska, Valeriy Pyatnytskiy, Andreas Schneider, Rainer Schweickert, Olexandr Shevtsov, and Olga 
Shumylo 2006: The Prospect of Deep Free Trade between the European Union and Ukraine. Brussels, Kiel 
and Kyiv: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IFW), and International 
Centre for Policy Studies (ICPS); Dreyer, Iana 2012: “Trade Policy in the EU’s Neighbourhood: Ways 
Forward for the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements.” Notre Europe Study and Research No. 
90. Paris: Notre Europe; Van de Water, Ina Kirsch. 2011. „Das Freihandelsabkommen mit der 
Europäischen Union (DCFTA): Potential für Reformen der ukrainischen Gesellschaft und die 
Modernisierung der ukrainischen Wirtschaft.“ Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. 
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agreement based on addressing the issue of selective justice and preventing its 
recurrence and implementing the reforms defined in the Association Agenda.3 Ukrainian 
President Viktor Yanukovych said he would put all his efforts into addressing these 
issues but also negotiated with Russia on a Eurasian Customs Union (with Belarus and 
Kasachstan), although EU representatives had repeatedly described these as mutually 
exclusive. 
 
In the months leading up to the summit, actors from the EU continued to encourage 
Ukraine to fulfil its prerequisites, emphasising that they were part of the Association 
Agenda. Russian concerns that signing the AA would violate the treaty on strategic 
partnership and friendship with Russia and warnings that it could lead to disruptions in 
trade resulting in financial difficulties for Ukraine as Russia was its main creditor and 
that Russia “would intervene if pro-Russian regions of the country appealed directly to 
Moscow”4 were addressed in an offhand manner, with Ashton and Füle stating that the 
Eastern Partnership “does not operate at the expenses of anyone” but rather “can be 
beneficial also for the regional cooperation and for the neighbours of EU's neighbours”, 
while it is “unacceptable to exercise pressure on partner countries willing to sign an 
Association Agreement with the EU.” 5 The closer the date for the summit, the more 
explicit these statements became. In September 2013, Commissioner Stefan Füle said: 
“Any threats – of any form – from Russia linked to the signing of agreements with the 
European Union are unacceptable“6, and in October 2013: “we stand ready to support 
their choices against undue interferences”7. It became clear already at this point that 
stating that the AA/DCFTA would not be to the detriment of Russia was not enough, and 
Füle therefore suggested “to find ways to promote greater regulatory convergence 
between the EU and members of the Customs Union”.8  
 
3. THE VILNIUS SUMMIT AND THE ENSUING CRISIS IN UKRAINE 
 
On 21 November 2013, Viktor Yanukovych announced that there would be no decision 
to free Yulia Tymochenko and that Ukraine would not sign the AA/DCFTA at the Vilnius 
summit on 28/29 November 2013. Instead, he agreed with Russia’s president Vladimir 
Putin on an 11 billion Euro loan and reduced gas prices for Ukraine, of which the first 
tranche was paid in December 2013, whereas the EU had offered a total of 600 million 
Euros to support the Ukrainian deficit. On 22 November 2013, the protests now known 
                                                 
3 Council of the European Union 2012: Foreign Affairs Council, 10 December 2012, p. 13, URL: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/134644.pdf (last 
accessed 3 March 2014). 
4 Walker, Shaun 2013: Ukraine’s EU trade deal will be catastrophic, says Russia, 22 September 2013, URL: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/22/ukraine-european-union-trade-russia (last accessed 
19 March 2014). 
5 European Union External Action Service 2013: Eastern Partnership: High Representative Ashton and 
Commissioner Fuele with Foreign Ministers on preparations for Vilnius, New York, 26 September 2013, p. 
2, URL: http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/130926_01_en.pdf (last accessed 3 March 2014). 
6 Fuele, Stefan 2013: Time to get stronger in our commitment to EaP and reforms in Ukraine, European 
Commission SPEECH /13/1055, 10 December 2013, 
URL: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-1055_en.htm (last accessed 3 March 2014). 
7 Fuele, Stefan 2013: EU-Ukraine: Dispelling the myths about the Association Agreement, European 
Commission SPEECH/13/808, 11 October 2013, URL: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-
808_en.htm (last accessed 3 March 2014). 
8 Fuele, Stefan 2013: EU-Ukraine: Dispelling the myths about the Association Agreement, European 
Commission SPEECH/13/808, 11 October 2013, URL: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-
808_en.htm (last accessed 3 March 2014). 
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as Euromaidan started. These protests of both organised groups and individual citizens 
with differing political opinions remained peaceful but without consequence for several 
months. Only after President Yanukovych tightened demonstration laws on 16 January 
2014 did the protests increase. 9 On 18 February 2014, shooting with live ammunition 
started and at the end of three violent days, 82 deaths were counted. Russia paid a 
further 2 billion of its loan on 18 February 2014, which some commentators have tied to 
the police violence. The EU intervened by sending the foreign ministers of Germany, 
France and Poland – Steinmeier, Fabius and Sikorski - who mediated a deal between 
President Yanukovych and the opposition. In addition, at an extraordinary Foreign 
Affairs Council on the same day, targeted sanctions vis-à-vis Ukraine and the suspension 
of export licences for equipment for internal repression to Ukraine were decided.10 The 
deal reached through negotiations mediated by the three foreign ministers envisaged 
presidential elections still in 2014, between September and December. This agreement 
broke the stalemate between government and opposition and led to an end of the 
violence, but its terms only lasted a few hours, after which elections were scheduled for 
25 May 2014. Despite long hesitation and the fact that the agreement did not hold for 
long, it was the activity by the EU that opened the deadlock in Ukraine, contrary to 
earlier expectations that other actors would become active (US, UN, OSCE). Steinmeier 
had even said himself at the end of 2013 that he was ill suited to mediate in Ukraine.11 
 
An interim government was presented on 26 February led by Arseniy Yatsenyuk and 
including several members of the extreme right wing Svoboda as high-ranking officials, 
such as Defence Minister Ihor Tenyukh. One of the first legislative actions of the new 
government was to introduce a law to abolish Russian as a regional language, leading to 
protests from Russian speaking citizens in Eastern Ukraine and on the Crimean 
peninsula. As members of the Party of Regions are not included in the interim 
government a large part of the Ukrainian population – be it Russian or Russian speaking 
is currently not represented. Russia does not recognise the interim government. It 
mobilised troops stationed in the western part of Russia, and increased Russian troop 
movements on the Crimean peninsula were reported by Ukrainian media. In reaction to 
this, the EU suspended bilateral talks with Russia on visa matters as well as on the New 
Agreement.12 
                                                 
9 Council of the European Union 2014: Council Conclusions on Ukraine, Foreign Affairs Council meeting, 
20 January 2014, URL:  
http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/140659.pdf (last accessed 3 
March 2014). 
10 Council of the European Union 2014: Council Conclusions on Ukraine, Foreign Affairs Council meeting, 
20 February 2014, URL:  
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/141110.pdf (last 
accessed 3 March 2014); European Union External Action Service 2014: Remarks by EU High 
Representative Catherine Ashton following the extraordinary Foreign Affairs Council on Ukraine, Brussels, 
20 February 2014, http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2014/140220_03_en.pdf (last accessed 3 
March 2014).  
11 Sturm, Daniel Friedrich 2013: Steinmeier lehnt eine Vermittlerrolle ab, Die Welt, 19 December 2013, 
URL: http://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article123143999/Steinmeier-lehnt-eine-Vermittlerrolle-
ab.html (last accessed 3 March 2014); see also Deutsche Welle 2013: Plenty for the new government to do, 
19.12.2013, URL: http://www.dw.de/plenty-for-the-new-government-to-do-in-europe/a-17306915 (last 
accessed 3 March 2014). 
12 European Council 2014: Remarks by President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy following 
the extraordinary meeting of EU Heads of State or Government on Ukraine, 6 March 2014, URL: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/141373.pdf (last accessed 19 
March 2014). 
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On 16 March 2014 a referendum on independence was held on the Crimean peninsula in 
which 97% of voters preferred joining the Russian Federation. Even though this 
referendum was widely condemned by many governments, the Russian president 
Vladimir Putin recognised Crimean independence on 17 March 2014. In reaction to this, 
the EU and the US decided on further sanctions against Russian, Ukrainian and Crimean 
individuals said to have been involved in this move for independence. 
 
Even though the final outcome of the events in Ukraine is not clear at this point, it is 
beginning to show that solving the crisis in Ukraine will become much more expensive 
for the EU now than it would have been had the EU decided to financially support the 
country more substantially before the summit. Russia has refused to continue its 
payments after Yanukovych is no longer in power as it sees Ukraine as lacking a 
government that could be held accountable. By the end of February 2014, the total sum 
said to be needed to stabilize the country financially was 25.5 billion Euro. Besides the 
financial cost, the political cost is much harder to estimate. Suspended visa talks and 
targeted sanctions against Russia are more symbolic than effectively hurting the Russian 
government and a disruption of gas exports to EU member states cannot be summarily 
excluded as a possible Russian reaction. In addition, visa liberalisation would benefit 
especially the Russian citizens and enable them to travel freely allowing them to form 
their own opinion about life in the EU. This confrontational approach, which also 
includes Stefan Füle’s offering Ukraine EU-membership, at this point in time, shows a 
lack of strategy concerning the current development of events.13 Since it is and must be 
the goal of the EU and its member states to make Europe a continent of peace and 
cooperation, the bridges it is now tearing down will have to be carefully rebuilt after the 
crisis is over.  
 
4. THREE INITIAL LESSONS LEARNT 
 
When analysing the events up to the end of February, there are three initial lessons to be 
learnt: 
 
1. The EU has wildly underestimated the role of Russia both in the negotiations on an 
AA/DCFTA and in dealing with the crisis in Ukraine. In addition, instead of trying to 
understand the Russian position and to keep communication channels open, actors and 
media have quickly turned to anti-Russian rhetoric without seriously considering 
Russian interest in the region or attempting to see Russia as a rational actor, while 
failing to equally scrutinize US economic interests in Ukraine, eg. Chevron’s gas drilling 
rights.14 It has taken Western media two weeks to realise the threat of the extreme right 
                                                 
13 Zeit online 2014: Erweiterungskommissar will Ukraine in die EU aufnehmen, 18 March 2014, URL: 
http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2014-03/ukraine-krim-eu-sanktionen-putin(last accessed 19 March 
2014); Kissinger, Henry A. 2014: „Eine Dämonisierung Putins ist keine Politik“ Vier Vorschläge für eine 
asubalancierte Unzufriedenheit, in: Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, 6 March 2014, URL: 
http://www.ipg-journal.de/kommentar/artikel/henry-a-kissinger-eine-daemonisierung-putins-ist-keine-
politik-298/ (last accessed 19 March 2014). 
14 Polityuk, Pavel/Balmforth, Richard 2013: Ukraine signs $10 billion shale gas deal with Chevron, 5 
November 2013, URL: http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/05/us-ukraine-chevron-
idUSBRE9A40ML20131105 (last accessed 19 March 2014). 
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wing Svoboda being part of the Ukrainian government, while Russia’s calling them out 
as Nazis all along had been put down to propaganda almost instinctively.15  
 
2. The role of the European External Action Service and the European Commission was 
weak in the months following the Vilnius summit, with their inability to agree on a 
common approach vis-à-vis Ukraine leading to the now infamous frustration of the 
assistant US secretary of state, Victoria Nuland.16 Significantly, while Catherine Ashton 
attended negotiations on Iran, three foreign ministers travelled to Ukraine to conduct 
negotiations on her behalf leading to an end of the violence.17 
 
3. The decreasing attractiveness of the Eastern Partnership to the partnership countries 
became apparent already before the Vilnius summit, when Armenia decided in 
September 2013 to put to a halt to negotiations of an Association Agreement in favour of 
membership in the Eurasian Union, which resulted in reduced prices for Russian gas. 
However, the EU did not question or change its approach towards the Eastern 
Partnership countries at the time. 
 
5. WHAT ROLE FOR RUSSIA? 
 
One quite frequent question regarding the role of Russia is whether it is a partner or an 
opponent in Central Europe, and the answer will remain: both. It is crucial to re-enter 
into a dialogue with Russia as soon as possible in order to identify common goals and 
interests or if necessary to find a compromise between the two. In order to be able to do 
so, the EU has to refrain from using cold war rhetoric, which would only reveal that it 
does not, as it maintains, see the Eastern Partnership as a win-win situation for the EU, 
Ukraine and Russia, but rather wants to engage in a geopolitical tug of war, the first two 
rounds of which it has lost spectacularly (Armenia, Ukraine). 
 
In the remarks by Catherine Ashton on the situation in Ukraine from 25 February 2014, 
it is evident in her reference to the relevance of Russia and its trade relations with 
Ukraine that some learning has already taken place.18 This more inclusive approach has 
also been chosen in a multi-party declaration of the European Parliament that “Russia, 
just like the EU, must live up to its responsibility for the stability and territorial integrity 
of Ukraine.”19 Commissioner Stefan Füle also wants to involve Russia: “Russia has a 
chance to become part of the efforts to bring stability and prosperity back to Ukraine, 
                                                 
15 Salem, Harriet 2014: Who exactly is governing Ukraine? 04.03.2014, URL: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/04/who-governing-ukraine-olexander-turchynov (last 
accessed 5 March 2014); Klußmann, Uwe 2014: Konflikt mit Russland: Die fatalen Fehler der Regierung in 
Kiew, 03.03.2014, URL: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/krim-krise-die-fatalen-fehler-der-kiewer-
regierung-a-956680.html (last accessed 5 March 2014). 
16 The Guardian 2014: ‘Fuck the EU’: US diplomat Victoria Nuland's phonecall leaked – video, 7. February 
2014, URL: http://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2014/feb/07/eu-us-diplomat-victoria-nuland-
phonecall-leaked-video (last accessed 5 March 2014). 
17 EEAS 2014: Remarks by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton in reaction to the agreement signed 
between President of Ukraine Yanukovych and the opposition leaders, London 21 February 2014, URL: 
http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2014/140221_07_en.pdf (last accessed 5 March 2014). 
18 European External Action Service 2014: Remarks by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton at the 
end of her visit to Ukraine, Kyiv, 25 February 2014, URL:  
http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2014/140225_01_en.pdf (last accessed 3 March 2014). 
19 Brok, Elmar 2014: Statement Elmar Brok MEP following EP delegation to Ukraine, 24 February 2014, 
URL: http://www.elmarbrok.de/archives/statement-elmar-brok-mep-following-ep-delegtion-to-ukraine 
(last accessed 3 March 2014). 
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including being part of the coordinated international efforts to help Ukraine address its 
economic challenges.”20  
 
It seems to be a first step in the right direction that the EU and Russia are now entering 
into technical negotiations on the effects of the DCFTAs on Russia, while continuing to 
leave the political decision on with whom and on what level to cooperate to the 
sovereign central European states. In addition, some actors in the EU are starting to see 
the need to consider making the DCFTA and Ukrainian membership compatible with 
affiliation with the Eurasian Customs Union on the basis of WTO-membership and rules. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
Despite some significant mistakes and despite underestimating the relevance of Russia 
for Central Europe economically and financially as well as the relevance of Central 
Europe to Russia politically and militarily, the aftermath of the Vilnius summit offers a 
chance for the EU to learn and to become a more proactive foreign policy actor. Its aim 
seems to be to put the Eastern Partnership back on track and to involve Russia more. 
This could be done in the following way: 
 
First of all, the EU should start a serious and moderated reflection process on its Foreign 
Policy priorities. In this reflection process, it should take into consideration its interests 
but also its limited resources, its strengths and weaknesses and base its priorities on its 
common values. It seems that one reason for the escalation of the situation was the 
unwillingness of the EU to invest in Ukraine’s future as it did not grasp the necessity for 
financial aid if Russia as a main lender would retreat, as it did not seem to be able to 
decide how much of a priority Ukraine should be. It can be expected that the 
neighbourhood will be one of the priorities emerging from such a reflection process 
because of its relevance for foreign policy and security, but also internal policy 
(migration) and economically. The fact that the EU together with the IMF is now willing 
to step up and offer Ukraine loans on a larger scale is a first indicator for this. 
 
Only after such a careful reflection process and based on its results is it time to 
reconfigure the Eastern Partnership and its instruments. In 2011, the then newly 
established EEAS and the Commission tried to find answers to the Arab Spring very 
quickly and before the situations had fully developed.21 This led to changes in the policy 
that did not turn out to be ideally suited for the problems the Mediterranean countries 
are currently facing. In this second step of the process, the issues of conditionality and 
differentiation will play a crucial role. In addition, other actors in the region – not only 
Russia but also the US and China - and their respective interests have to be taken into 
consideration to see what room for manoeuvre the EU actually has. If the EU continues 
to acknowledge the high relevance that its immediate neighbours have for its own well-
being and the responsibility it in turn has that the people in these countries are able to 
enjoy the same rights and opportunities as EU citizens, it will be on the right track to a 
more sustainable foreign policy towards Eastern Europe. 
 
                                                 
20 Rettman, Andrew 2014: EU urges Russia to help stabilise Ukraine, EUobserver, 27 February 2014, URL: 
http://euobserver.com/foreign/123296 (last accessed 3 March 2014). 
21 High Representative of The Union For Foreign Affairs And Security Policy/European Commission 2011: 
A new response to a changing neighbourhood, URL:  
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com_11_303_en.pdf (last accessed 3 March 2014). 
